DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 333 845 HE 024 705

AUTHOR Mc-Daniel, Olaf C.
TITLE The Validity of the Argument for the Necessity of Institutional Autonomy in Higher Education.
INSTITUTION Netherlands Ministry of Education and Sciences, The Hague.
PUB DATE 16 Aug 90
NOTE 18p.; Paper presented at the Blindernkonferansen (Oslo, Norway, August 16, 1990). For related documents, see HE 024 704-709.
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Viewpoints (Opinion/Position Papers, Essays, etc.) (120)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Academic Freedom; Competition; Consumer Economics; Delphi Technique; Educational Quality; Financial Support; Foreign Countries; Governance; *Government Role; *Government School Relationship; *Higher Education; *Institutional Autonomy; Political Influences

ABSTRACT

One of a series of studies related to the Delphi research project: "Policy Instruments for Higher Education in the Western Europe of the Future", this paper reports that, despite the many complaints about government influences on higher education, both U.S. and European studies show that it has only a limited effect on higher education in practice. In the debate the importance of government influence as a factor is overestimated. The five forces which shape higher education are competition (for students, faculty, funds, reputation), multiplicity of funds (no predominant dependency on a single funding institution), serving different constituencies, consumer power, and public view on quality. These forces are in practice more decisive for the functioning of the system than the presence of government influence. If these forces are combined with limited government influence, they can enhance a semi-market orientation on the part of the institutions. Government influence can provide an effective partnership to optimize the use of the five basic forces by enhancing self-regulatory and market-oriented institutional behavior. This paper is divided into two parts, the first contains thoughts on governance presented briefly. These are explained further in the notes which provide source information and data. The second part explicates the thesis summarized above.(JB)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

The validity of the argument for the necessity of institutional autonomy in higher education.

ED333845

Paper presented at the Blindernkonferansen 1990
Oslo, August 16 1990

Article published in the series of studies related to the Delphi research project: "Policy Instruments for Higher Education in the Western-Europe of the Future".

correspondence:

Olaf C. mc-Daniel
Delphi study
Postbus 25000, G229/353
2700 LZ Zoetermeer
The Netherlands
Tel: ** 31 - 79533667
Fax: ** 31 - 79512651

Zoetermeer, August 1990

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

HE 024 705

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☐ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☑ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

OLAF C. MCDANIEL

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Contents:

Introduction

Part 1 thoughts on governance (a set of statements)

Part 2 what makes the system work ?

notes

Introduction

Questioning the balance of power

"Higher education around the world is dominated by government. In all countries the government provides the bulk of the funding of the institutions and most colleges (even private institutions in the US) are governmental institutions. Understanding of the impact of governmental domination of the academy by scholars is not very good" (1).

This quote from one of the more recent studies on the impact of government influence on higher education in the US expresses a notion which is gaining more and more attention in Western Europe. Is the way in which the higher education system is set up productive with regard to its scientific and societal goals? Does the balance of power between government as the basic investor and the higher education institutions (universities and/or higher vocational institutions) provide a basis for adequate institutional development and public accountability? Is government policy in practice a violation of academic freedom and institutional autonomy?

In this paper the issue of government influence is discussed from a West European perspective, using theoretical distinctions and empirical studies from both sides of the Atlantic. The paper provides a basis for a discussion of the conditions for, the effect and future of the governance of higher education.

The paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, thoughts on governance are presented briefly, almost as single statements. The statements are explained further in the notes. The second part, what makes the system work, explains why it is concluded that the position of government in higher education is, however important, not the decisive factor in developing a responsive, innovative and quality-oriented higher education system.

Part 1: Thoughts on governance (a set of statements)

Preliminary assumptions

1 The present balance of power between the institutional autonomy and government influence in West-European and U.S. higher education systems, is under discussion. The general opinion is that government behavior is intrusive (2).

2 Higher education in Western Europe is mainly funded by governments or through organizations that operate on behalf of governments (3). Institutions are dependent on this contribution. There is no reason to believe that this dependence will change significantly in the coming decade. Higher education in Europe is and remains a public affair.

3 Solutions for present questions connected with the issue of governance, which do not accept public accountability, have little impact on the political discussion.

4 Solutions that would completely prevent carrying out a number of political goals by a public higher education system also have little impact (4).

5 The main question with regard to desirable future government influence in a public higher education system is not: why does government (or other agents representing the public interest) insist on influence on institutional policy. The main question is, in which setting and under which conditions can external influence be used as an effective and innovative source.

Governance as a subject of study

Slowly but surely the dynamics of the governance of higher education systems became the subject of study. The use of governing theories "borrowed" from organizational and/or political models (5) has now evolved into a better understanding of the basic intrinsic values and philosophy of the higher education system. The fundamental properties and dynamics of the higher education system are now a more extensive focus of organizational theory and research. The increase in knowledge of the subject helps us to understand some of the system's intrinsic boundaries. A few examples (6):

- the nature of higher education (the generation and transfer of knowledge) intrinsically limits effective direction of policy
- the complexity of the system and the high degree of specialization offers h.e. institutions much scope for avoiding and ignoring government direction
- higher education cannot be governed as a corporate enterprise producing and transferring knowledge
- higher education operates at the margin of a large number of influences and interests
- only in a situation in which an institution of higher education were to be completely financially independent, would it have the ability to govern itself without outside controls
- Since universities are always an integral part of society, their autonomy cannot be absolute, and their activities cannot be beyond the jurisdiction of the criminal and civil laws that obtain in the whole of society

These premises lead to the general acceptance of the ideas of academic freedom, peer judgments, and a substantial level of institutional autonomy: "No good book was ever written on command, nor can good teaching occur under duress" (7).

Government-institutional relationship

The landscape of government influence on higher education in Europe shows different patterns. The variety between countries is extreme and varies from very centralized to more or less decentralized (8). The problem for state governments in the past forty years has remained constant: how to reconcile the public stake in higher education with the campus or institutional interest in freedom of action. But while the problem has remained constant, the attempts at a solution have been diverse (9).

Government uses different types of tools of government (10). The use of these instruments varies by country or by state in the US. Sometimes the absence of strong central legislation is overwhelmingly overshadowed by the use of other instruments such as financing (for example in the UK). In other cases the legislation is massive, but the budget is presented as a lump sum (as in the Netherlands). The cumulative effect of the use of instruments is the decisive factor in the balance of power between governments on the one side and institutions on the other (11).

Academic freedom and institutional autonomy

The discussion on state involvement in higher education is often confused by the lack of distinction between the issues of "academic freedom" and "institutional autonomy" (12). To separate the wheat from the chaff, the following distinction by Berdahl is helpful:

a **procedural autonomy**
This refers to the question, how do you wish to achieve your goal? Government can "preaudit your budget, a state personnel system or a state purchasing system, or require that you use a state architect etc.);

b **substantive autonomy**
What do you wish to achieve: the actual substance, outcome or performance.

With some minor exceptions, general behavior in West European countries does not affect the substantive autonomy. Governments remain within the boundaries of procedural autonomy (13).

Intrinsic innovative capacity of higher education

Higher education institutions will not operate effectively as completely autonomous institutions. The reason is two-fold:

1 the expected behavior of institutional administrators, which could lead to the misuse or inefficient spending of public money (14)

2 the expected behavior of faculty: academic staff are basically conservative and geared towards serving their own interest (15)

Arbiters

Arbiters are required to decide between the various conflicting interests and keep the system alive and kicking. It is in the that way these arbiters work that the most basic differences between the systems in the US and the European countries occur. In European countries the arbiter is a mixture of administrative tools, most often created by governments and/or parliaments which enforces a certain institutional behavior (16).
In the U.S. however, the system is also controlled by a number of different influences:

a competition between institutions for students, staff, grants etc.

b multiple sources of funding, which eliminates supremacy of one major investing party.

c serving different constituencies and interests, and being publicly accountable for the institutional performance

d consumer power (consumers as a major source of income and a client that should be treated well)

e a public view of quality of institutional performance that can influence consumers though the availability of peer review quality judgments.

Methods of influencing higher education.

The three most important variables for influence on higher education are the following types of coordination: state authority, market and academic oligarchy (17).
Given the special tasks of higher education, it is not possible to coordinate by the market alone, nor can either state or professional hegemony in itself do what must be done (18).
The mixture of the three types of influence in the West European countries and in the states of the U.S, expresses the local view on "the appropriate balance between the state's legitimate concern to represent the public interest and an institution's legitimate concern to preserve those elements of its academic objectives that are crucial to preserving appropriate professional judgement (19).
A large number of different techniques for influencing higher education can be identified (20).

Effect of government intervention on higher education

Basic to the assumptions on the influence of government on higher education, is the hypothesis that their actions have effect. European studies (21) show however that in general:

a government-directed innovations lack success;

b government intrusion in academic affairs is rare;

c regulatory powers of government are in practice not a major obstacle in the innovation of the curriculum;

d regulatory powers of government have little impact on the real quality of teaching. The conclusions in the US studies (22) are comparable. Furthermore they show no causal relationship between government influence and quality.

Part 2: what makes the system work ?

Despite the many complaints about government behavior, both American and European studies show that it has only a limited effect on higher education in practice. The conclusion is, that in the debate the importance of government influence as a factor is overestimated.
Nevertheless, the regulatory framework can design strict conditions and boundaries, which hamper the development of the system (or parts of it). The limitation of bureaucracy, abolition of unproductive intervention and a revised division of power that accepts and respects the responsibilities of all parties involved, will no doubt have some positive effects on the performance of higher education.
In that respect it would be interesting to analyze the anatomy of U.S. higher education. Trow (1988) argues that the system of higher education in the US was created "a preternaturally precocious system of higher education with an enormous capacity for expansion without fundamental structural change". What is impressive about American higher education is "not how much it differs from the system that exists at the turn of the century, but how similar it is in basic structure, diversity, mission, governance and finance" (23).
This assumption underlies the notion of a limited set of intrinsic system variables that are basic to the dynamics of the system. The level of institutional adaptability and responsiveness is not limited to the relationship between the funding government and institutions, but - and more important - it is built in into the system by certain distinctive features. The interesting difference in higher education policy between that in a number of countries in Europe and that in the US, is that in the US, important achievements that are policy goals in Europe (such as diversity, responsiveness, quality awareness, institutional missions), are in the US mostly the result of the characteristics of the system in which competition, the serving of multiple funding sources and the availability of at least some judgments of quality. Most governments in Europe attempt to reach comparable goals by different means, but in practice not very successfully. But as long as the system remains within its traditional boundaries of governance and dependence of one single funding institution, lacking competition, these measures will only lead to incremental adjustments that have to be altered as soon as conditions change again.
Would the solution be to create more private institutions in Europe? West European countries have a limited tradition of this, and some American authors present the enlargement of private education as an important solution for European problems. Within the European tradition, hoping for massive investments in private higher education as the answer to some basic higher education questions, is like waiting for pigs to fly! It would be much wiser to introduce some of these strong and dynamic features into the public higher education systems and make use of the changes available.
The basic dynamics are :

1. competition (for students, faculty, funds, reputation)
2. multiplicity of funds (no predominant dependency on a single funding institution)
3. serving different constituencies (serving different interests at the same time and being publicly accountable for that)
4. consumer power (consumers as a major source of income, a client who should be treated well)
5. public view on quality (although in practice only oriented towards research, influential on the institutions' chances to attract funds, students, to be able to compete).

In my view these forces are the essential factors that shape the higher education system. These forces are in practice more decisive for the functioning of the system than the presence of government influence.
If these forces are combined with limited government influence, they can enhance a semi-market orientation on the part of the institutions. Full-scale market orientation would especially endanger the basic research function of the institution and negate a number of (governmental) public policy goals (24). Basic governmental attitude ought to be the enhancement of self-regulatory and market-oriented institutional behavior. Government can pave

the way to optimizing the use of the five basic forces. Under such conditions, government influence need not become an "ineffectual relationship" (25) but can be reshaped into an "effective partnership" (26).

Notes

1 Amacher RC and Meiners, G. The Academy and the State. In: Federal Support of Higher Education p.1-9. Paragon House, New York, 1989.

2 Government behavior is generally described as intrusive both in the U.S. and in Western Europe. In the U.S. a number of authors has, over the last decade, warned of an increase in government intervention. The Delphi study related to the project "Policy instruments for higher education in the Western Europe of the future" (mc-Daniel, 1991 forthcoming) shows that in most countries in Western Europe, the level of government influence is evaluated as too high or much too high.

3 In Western Europe, higher education is basically a public affair. The vast majority of the funds that teaching and research institutions rely on, is of a government nature. Sometimes these are distributed directly as an appropriation for teaching and research, sometimes through an intermediate structure (research councils in all Western European countries, the University Funding Council and the Polytechnic and Colleges Funding Council in the UK, the UHA in Sweden) or as an appropriation for specific tasks or aims. Other than in the United States, where a majority of the higher education institutions has a private status, European countries have little tradition in private initiatives for the establishment of higher education facilities.

4 At least three main arguments for government influence can be distinguished: Its public character is a first argument in favor of government influence, and thus a certain limitation of the autonomy of higher education institutions. Governments have certain intentions in subsidizing basic research and teaching at the post-secondary level. Governments wish to see results and value for money! A second argument is the lack of belief that institutions are able to run the system or implement major change without government support or government enforcement. To give an example, the rapid expansion of higher education in the Sixties, Seventies and especially the Eighties in almost all West European countries caused an increasing pressure on the public budget. Questions were raised with regard to the overall efficiency and effectiveness of higher education institutions. In many countries the state saw it as its political responsibility to organize change by means of direct influence or through an intermediate agent. Thirdly, higher education has become a vital element of economic prosperity and is increasingly asked to contribute and respond to societal changes and problems. Governments want the assurance that institutions are contributing in that direction.

5 See for instance Birnbaum, who integrates the collegiate model, the bureaucratic model, the political model and the anarchical models, into a cybernetic model (Birnbaum, R. How Colleges Work, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco 1988)

6 See: Van Vught (Plan- en marktcoordinatie in het hoger onderwijs. Inaugural lecture TUT, Enschede 1987), Slaughter (The Higher Learning and High Technology. Dynamics of Higher Education Policy Formation. State University of New York Press, New York, 1990), Millett 1984 (see note 9), Hook (Intellectual Freedom and Government Sponsorship of Higher Education. In: Meiners c.s, Paragon House, New York, 1989), mc-Daniel and Wretborn (Higher Education in Sweden and the Netherlands, Zoetermeer 1988)

7 Bok, D. Universities and the Future of America. Duke University Press, London and Durham, 1990 page p. 111).

8 This pattern is comparable to the U.S. where the separate states have the authority on higher education policy. Contrary to the general opinion in West-European countries, higher education institutions in the U.S. are subject to strong state government supervision. See for instance McGuinness , Handbook 1988 on Postsecondary Education Structures. ECS, Denver 1988.

9 Millett, J.D. Conflict in Higher Education. State Government Versus Institutional Independence. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1984 p. 215.

10 Government influence is enforced by a number of "tools of government" (Hood, Chr. The Tools of Government, London 1983). In West European countries a mixture of the following instruments is used (mc-Daniel, The Netherlands into the Nineties. Zoetermeer 1987 p. 17):

a legislation
b financing
c planning
d other forces of a non-coercive kind.

11 See Newman, F. Choosing Quality. Reducing Conflict Between the State and the University. Education Commission of the States, Denver 1987 and Hines, E. Higher Education and State Governments. Rene wed Partnership, Cooperation, or Competition? ASHE-ERIC, Washington 1988.

12 Berdahl argues that: "A major source of current friction is that many academies are trying to protect too much, and many persons in the state government are trying to claim too much. A fundamental cause of this confusion is the failure of persons on both sides to recognize freedom and university autonomy, though related, are not synonymous and that university state relations in the one area may quite properly differ from those in the other" (Berdahl, 1971 p. 5). In order to be able to understand the difference between institutional autonomy and academic freedom and to be able to judge if government is intrusive in its endeavor for quality, accountability or whatever argument it might be, Berdahl distinguished two types of autonomy: the substantive and the procedural. In: Berdahl, Robert O. Statewide coordination of Higher Education. American Council on Education, Washington D.C, 1971.

13 The arguments of serious government intrusion in academic affairs have, in the European setting, seldom been convincing. Academic freedom is and remains a precious and vital element in the generation and transfer of knowledge. A few incidents aside, there is little evidence of a massive attempt by governments or others in the Western world in the Post-War period to intrude on the real academic values, in the sense of being able to use the methodology that the faculty accepts as being most appropriate and teach their interpretation of the subject in their field of expertise. The one exception is the McCarthy period in the US. "The most conspicuous feature of the immediately post-World War II years in academe was the "Red Hunt" carried out on many university campuses by the Dies Committee, aided and abetted by Senator McCarthy, whose line was communists in government, while the Dies Committee pursued radicals on college campuses and in the labor movement and the entertainment world" (Smith, P. Killing the Spirit, New York, 1990 p. 137).

14 On the (supposed) patterns of behavior of administrators of higher education institutions. Niskanen (Bureaucracy between self-interest and public interest. In: Hanusch , 1983) stresses the endeavours to maximize the budget in bureaucratic organizations, which might run counter to the aims and targets formulated in public policy. Within this theoretical framework Boorsma, Koelman en Kok (Ombuigingen binnen een instelling voor wetenschappelijk onder- wijs; de TH-Twente als Case Study. Zoetermeer 1986) analyzed the behavior patterns of higher education institutions in a period of budgetary contraction, and came to comparable conclusions. Orzechowski (see Boorsma cs. 1986 p. 158) found that administrators of public universities will attempt to use any financial

space for overstaffing, while Williamson (The economics of discretionary behavior; managerial objectives in a theory of the firm. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.1964) points out the likelihood of the use of available additional money to improve the emoluments of personnel.

15 Reference to publications expressing ideas on the general behavior of the personnel responsible for teaching and research. The fact that faculty is basically conservative and primarily focussed on individual or disciplinary interests is stressed by many authors (see for instance: Rhoades,Higher education in a consumer society. In: Journal of higher education, Vol. 58 No. 1 (Jan/Febr. 1987) p. 1-24, Boyer, E. College, the undergraduate experience in America. New York, 1987, Bok, Higher Learning, 1987, Wilshire, B. The Moral Collapse of the University. Professionalism, Purity and Alienation. State University of New York Press, 1990). As long as the pursuit of individual profits does not dominate, this is not necessarily a negative attitude. Nonetheless arbiters are needed to decide between the various conflicting interests.

16 Two critical remarks have to be made. First of all, the bureaucratic behavior of institutions in not the only subject of criticism. The way in which government uses its authority is criticized in structural terms: Glenny (State Coordination of Higher Education. The Modern Concept. Denver. State Higher Education Executive Officers. ED 270 070. 1985, p. 15) concludes that "agencies with regulatory power, (have) the tendency to manage too much detail, to become bureaucratic "data messengers: in operations and, in doing so, fail to meet state needs for aggressive planning and leadership". Secondly the assumption that the "government" or the "state" would reflect a unanimous and predictable behavior. " (...) The state is not monolithic, that various branches, levels, and component parts of the state respond to different, sometimes competing or conflicting constituencies, and, in some instances, that the state is able to order constructively the claims, interests, and energies of players in the higher education formation process. The state is no longer simply the source of monies or a policing agency, but is simultaneously a multi- faceted resource, the arena in which policy formation is played out, and an actor in its own right, with an often unpredictable agenda" (Slaughter, S. The Higher Learning and High Technology. Dynamics of Higher Education Policy Formation. State University of New York Press, New York, 1990 p. 1, 2).

17 "The special function of state authority is to articulate a variety of public interests, including equity, as these are defined by prevailing groups within and outside of government. The special function of the market is to enhance and protect freedom of choice, for personnel, clientele, and institutions, and thereby indirectly promote system flexibility and adapta- bility. The function of academic oligarchy is to protect professional self-rule, to lodge the control of academic work, including its standards, in the hands of those permanently involved and most intimately acquainted with it". 91). One form of coordination should not be pursued fanatically to the exclusion of others. See: Clark, R. Coordination: Patterns and Processes. In: Twelve Systems of Higher Education: Six Decisive Issues. International Council for Educational Development, New York, 1978, page 57-97.

18 Clark (see note 17) p. 91.

19 Mortimer K. State Policy and Institutional Autonomy. Keynote Address: ASHE, Annual Meeting, November 1987.

20 Clark (1978, see note 17) distinguishes four main pathways of coordination, consisting of 14 routes of expanding influence:
I. Pathways of bureaucratic coordination:
route 1: layering (levels of coordination)
route 2: jurisdictional expansion
route 3: increasing specialization
route 4: administrative specialization
route 5: rule expansion

II. Pathways of political coordination:
route 1: increased regime and party involvement
route 2: increased corporatism
route 3: increased participation

III. Pathways of professional coordination:
route 1: expansion of subject expertise
route 2: expansion of central collegial bodies
route 3: expansion of faculty interest organization

IV. Pathways of market coordination:
route 1: consumer sovereignty
route 2: creeping institutional markets
route 3: extension of market power

Clarck used an updated and improved version of this scheme in his 1983 standard work: }the higher Education System, Academic Organization in Cross-National Perspective (University of California Press, 1983 p. 146-169):
I. Pathways of bureaucratic coordination:
route 1: layering (levels of coordination)
route 2: jurisdictional expansion
route 3: personal enlargement
route 4: administrative specialization
route 5: rule expansion

II. Pathways of political coordination:
route 1: ascending political priority
route 2: deepening of political involvement
route 3: hardening of interests

III. Pathways of professional coordination:
route 1: expansion of subject expertise
route 2: expansion of central collegial bodies
route 3: expansion of faculty interest organization

IV. Pathways of market coordination:
route 1: consumer sovereignty
route 2: labor markets
route 3: institutional markets

Especially the pathways of political coordination and market coordination have been adjusted.

Cross and McCartan (1984) distinguish four basic scenarios for government influence:

a the laissez faire approach

b the encouragement approach:
- planning and setting of goals
- collecting and disseminating data
- creative incentives
- promoting local cooperation
- sponsoring conferences and seminars

c intervention:
- delegating responsibility for coordination
- justification
- central coordination
- regulating providers

d direct support and services
- justification
- funding programs diversity
- establishing state wide programs

Within the basic distinctions: "planning versus market oriented higher education systems" see for instance Hufner (1985) and mc-Daniel (1991, forthcoming) the use of policy instruments. The list of the use of tools of government in higher education policy can be presented in the following continuum:


FULL SCALE GOVERNMENT PLANNING
multiple use of Tools Of Government directed at input and output
multiple use of Tools Of Government as an input boundary (shared responsibility)
single use of Tools Of Government directed at input and output
single use of Tools Of Government as a boundary (shared responsibility)
direction by single incentive steering
direction by multiple incentive steering
single use of Tools Of Government directed at output
multiple use of Tools Of Government directed at output
simple cybernetic model
complex cybernetic model
single competition between institutions
multiple competition between institutions
DIRECTION BY MARKET
decrease
institutional autonomy
increase

21 The two most recent and most extensive European studies on this issue are by van Vught c.s. (Governmental Strategies and Innovation in Higher Education, Jessica Kingsley Publishers, London, 1989) and Cerych and Sabatier (Great Expectations and Mixed Performance: the Implementation of Higher Education Reforms in Europe. Trentham Books, Trentham 1986). Both works contain a number of case studies, which are related to different European countries. The research method used is in both cases a mixture of study of the literature, observation and interviews on the spot. Unlike most of the US studies less statistical methods are used and the conclusions are based on peer evaluations of the various countries (van Vught c.s.) or innovation projects (Cerych and Sabatier). A third study, a delphi study "Policy instruments for higher education in the Western Europe of the future" (mc-Daniel, 1991 forthcoming) sets out the opinion of the 600 participants in that study. In the following (preliminary) tables the success of policy direction in a number of selected countries is valued according to the judgments of the participants of the study.

Table 1 Self esteem.

Is your higher education system sufficietly:

1 receptive to changing conditions
2 innovative
3 quality oriented
4 responsive to changing conditions in the labor market
5 accessible for student that future needs can be met
6 geared towards internationalization?

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6
01 Austria	−−	−−	−	−−	−	−−−
02 Belgium	+	+	+++	+	++	+
03 Denmark	++	++	++	++	+	−−
04 FR Germany	+	+	++	++	++	−
05 Finland	−	0	++	−	−	+
06 France	−	−	++	0	0	−
07 Greece	−−−	−−	−−−	−−−	−−	−−−
08 Ireland	++	++	++	++	−	−
09 Italy	−−−	−−	++	−−−	+	−−−
10 Luxembourg	+	+	+	0	−−−	−−−
11 Netherlands	++	++	++	++	++	−
12 Norway	−	−−	−	+	+	−−
13 Portugal	+	−−	0	−	−−	−−
14 Spain	−−	−−−	−−−	−−−	−	−−
15 Sweden	++	+	−	++	++	−
16 Switzerland	++	+	+++	+	+	−
17 Un. Kingdom	++	++	+++	++	−−	−−
Total:	+	+	++	+	+	−

Notes:

−−−	=	inclined to be negative and lower
−−	=	towards inclined to be negative
−	=	below neutral
0	=	neutral
+	=	above neitral
++	=	towards inclined to be positive
+++	=	inclined to be positive and above

Total cases:

receptivity	:522 respondents
innovation and quality orientation	:521 respondents
labor market, accessibility and internationalization	:371 respondents

Table 2 General effect of government intervention

	not very influential	not very effective	causing bureau-cracy	threat to academic freedom
01 Austria	−	+	+++	−−
02 Belgium	+	++	+++	++
03 Denmark	+	−	+++	+
04 FR Germany	+	++	+++	−
05 Finland	+	++	+++	−
06 France	−−	++	+++	−−
07 Greece	++	++	+++	−
08 Ireland	+	+	++	−
09 Italy	−−−	+	+++	−−
10 Luxembourg	+	++	++	++
11 Netherlands	0	++	++	−−
12 Norway	++	+	+	−−−
13 Portugal	++	++	++	−
14 Spain	−−	++	++	+
15 Sweden	++	++	+++	−−
16 Switzerland	+++	+	+	−−
17 Un. Kingdom	−	+	+++	++
Mean score:	+	++	++	−

Notes:

−−−	=	inclined to be negative and lower
−−	=	towards inclined to be negative
−	=	below neutral
0	=	neutral
+	=	above neutral
++	=	towards inclined to be positive
+++	=	inclined to be positive and above

Total cases: 524

Table 3 The success of policy direction

Country	issues 1	2	3	4	5	6	7
01 Austria	--	--	---	--	---	+	--
02 Belgium	---	---	--	---	--	--	---
03 Denmark	--	--	--	--	---	--	+
04 FR Germany	--	--	+++	---	----	--	--
05 Finland	+	-	---	--	--	+	+
06 France	---	--	---	----	--	-	--
07 Greece	----	---	---	----	---	--	--
08 Ireland	--	--	---	----	---	--	--
09 Italy	---	----	---	---	--	---	--
10 Luxembourg	---	---	++	--	---	--	---
11 Netherlands	-	--	-	--	---	+	-
12 Norway	0	-	+	--	--	-	-
13 Portugal	---	-	--	--	--	-	--
14 Spain	--	-	-	---	---	-	-
15 Sweden	-	--	--	---	---	+	+
16 Switzerland	-	+	++	--	-	+	-
17 Un. Kingdom	-	---	---	---	---	--	+
Mean score:	--	--	--	---	---	-	-

Notes:

----	=	negative and lower
---	=	inclined to be negative
--	=	towards inclined to be negative
-	=	below neutral
0	=	neutral
+	=	above neutral
++	=	towards inclined to be positive
+++	=	inclined to be positive and above

22 The conclusions of US case studies point in the same direction. As mentioned, the approach to the basic questions is more statistically oriented. The approach is empirical, which makes it especially interesting since in Europe it is a more speculative. However the statistical method is both a strength and a weakness. It has its strength in the production of more stable and objective data than the observations in the European studies. The weakness is the necessary limitation in scope: only data that can be used in statistical analysis are subject to review. Here, in short, are the basic findings in the most important studies on this subject in the Eighties. Volkwein (1986, and 1989) touches upon the issue of institutional autonomy on the one hand and the degree of State regulation (as an expression of the desire for accountability to the tax-payers) on the other. The study is extensive and illuminates statistical evidence for the plausibility of a number of hypotheses that usually appear in the debate on institutional autonomy versus state regulation. His conclusion was that: "The study found little evidence that freedom from the burdens of control encourages individual campuses to reduce administrative overhead" (page 282). "Much to the disappointment of campus managers, this study failed to find a significant association between flexibility and the various measures of administrative costs, elaborateness, and salary. There is, on the other hand, no evidence that a heavy dose of state fiscal control saves the taxpayers any money or forces the universities to operate more efficiently. (...) These findings should raise questions among state policy makers about the value of spending human energy and state resources on centralized control practices, which have so little impact on the campus level" (p. 283, 284). (State Financial Control of Public Universities and its Relationship to Campus Administrative Elaborateness and Cost: Results of a National Study, In: Review of Higher Education, 1986 Volume 8 no. 3. Changes in Quality among Public Universities, In: Journal of Higher Education, 1989 Vol. 60 no.2.)

Fischer (State legislators and the autonomy of colleges and universities: A comparative study of legislation in four states: 1900 - 1979. In : The Journal of Higher Education, 1988, Volume 59 no. 2) performed a comparative analysis in four U.S. states with the basic question: "Do state legislatures pose an increasing threat to the autonomy of colleges and universities?" (p. 133). The final conclusion is that "a detailed study of major governance acts does not suggest an increased tendency of state legislators in recent decades to restrict institutional autonomy in any of the four states. State legislatures and other state government bodies have always been involved in and to some extent have always intruded upon the affairs of higher education. There has been a continual feeling that, although intrusions by state legislatures had not yet gone too far, institutions might be on the brink of serious loss of autonomy. Institutions have long felt the best protection is vigilance. It should be interesting to view state legislatures and institutional autonomy from this perspective in another decade" (p. 159).
The Carnegie Foundation for the advancement of teaching published in 1982 an extensive report called: "The control of the campus. A report on the governance of higher education" The study showed there are real limits to the government's capacity to regulate higher education. As public officials introduce more and more supervisory requirements, the process becomes overburdened, contradictory, and finally incoherent. "We conclude that improvement will not come from better management of the government's regulatory functions, although this is certain a worthy goal to be pursued. Instead, the academy must rediscover more effective ways to regulate itself" (p. 67). "However, we conclude that the most serious problem encountered by higher education is the cumulative impact of government intervention. Taken by itself, any single action may not be unbearably intrusive, but the combined impact of many actions can nearly suffocate an institution. As public officials ask colleges and universities to defend their decisions, they inadvertently reshape the institution in fundamental ways. Priorities are shifted as faculty and administrators spend more time on paperwork than on academic planning" (p. 66).
Zusman (Legislature and University Conflict: the Case of California. In: The Review of Higher Education, 1986 Volume 9 no. 4) investigated the attitude of the Californian legislature towards higher education and presents a number of implications for policy.

A "Because legislators and university officials use simplified criteria to identify violations of authority, they may overreact to a situation. (...)

B By avoiding clearer definition of legislative authority, the university may enable the legislature more easily to encroach on university territory. On the other hand, a fuzzy authority line may allow each side to claim more authority and even reduce some overt conflicts by giving the parties the flexibility to make minor adjust- ments to meet new condition without losing face " (p. 416).

C Both parties often use "proxy issues when actual matters in conflict are too politically sensitive to discuss openly or when direct legal remedies are unavailable. As a result, underlying issues and values may be left unaddressed, and important policy decisions may be made through non-decision or as a side effect of other decision" (p. 416).

D (in California) "both internal university constituencies and external interest groups have become more willing to appeal to the legislature to resolve grievances with the university administration and board of regents" (p. 416).

23 Trow, Comparative Perspectives on Higher Education Policy in the UK and the USA. In: Oxford Review of Education, 1988. Vol. 14, no.1.

24 Full market conditions are neither desirable nor possible. Besides those mentioned, there are a number of other reasons, such as:

a there are no true market conditions, the prices are heavily subsidized;

b the student-consumer does not have perfect information about his/her choice;

c there is danger of what competition might do to the standards of the institution. They might be faced with a choice between survival and integrity.

25 Frank Newman, 1987 p. 35 (see note 11).

26 Ed Hines, 1988 (see note 11).